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Abstract
Safety-critical applications in transportation require GNSS-based positioning with high
levels of continuity, accuracy and integrity. The system needs to detect and exclude faults
and to raise an alarm in the event of unsafe positioning. This capability is referred to as
integrity monitoring (IM). While IM was considered until recently only in aviation, it is
currently a key performance parameter in land applications, such as Intelligent Transport
Systems (ITS). In this chapter the IM concepts, models and methods developed so far are
compared. In particular, Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE) and bounding of position-
ing errors methods borrowed from aviation (i.e. Weighted RAIM and ARAIM) are
discussed in detail, in view of their possible adoption for land applications. Their
strengths and limitations, and the modifications needed for application in the different
context are highlighted. A practical demonstration of IM in ITS is presented.
Keywords: ITS, C-ITS, integrity monitoring, RAIM, FDE, SBAS
1. Introduction
Integrity is a key performance parameter in positioning for ITS safety applications [1, 2]. To
provide absolute positioning in safety-critical and mission-critical applications, satellite navi-
gation shall maintain a very high level of service. Correctness— within tight bounds— of the
position solution, shall be guaranteed to extremely high levels of probability. In aviation, the
risk for so-called Hazardous Misleading Information (HMI) due to the navigation system is
typically budgeted at the 107 to 109 level, and a similar level of safety is expected to be
required in land applications in the era of fully automated transportation. In more formal
terms, integrity is about the trust that a user (or the AI in charge of the vehicle) can have in
the indicated position information. The trust is measured by the probability of HMI (or
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integrity risk), which is the probability that the position error exceeds a certain tolerance,
without being detected and an alert being raised in time. The given position information will
then be misleading, as it is not correct within specified bounds, and the user is not aware of the
potentially hazardous situation.
While IM was considered until recently only in aviation, it is currently a key performance
parameter in safety-critical land applications. Even though integrity requirements in vehicular
transport have not been defined yet, the demand for higher levels of automation in an increas-
ing number of applications is pushing the relevant authorities to fill this gap.
1.1. Integrity monitoring in aviation
Today, integrity monitoring in aviation is implemented in two different ways, at system level
or at user level. At system level, two types of external augmentation systems can be distin-
guished, Space-Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS), see [3, 4], and Ground-Based Augmen-
tation Systems (GBAS), see [5]. Both are Differential GPS systems (DGPS). SBAS and GBAS
develop corrections that improve the accuracy of the measurements and generate real-time
error bounds. These bounds are called Protection Levels (PL) and must exceed the actual error
under all conditions with very high probability [6]. SBAS and GBAS are both very powerful
means of guaranteeing integrity, but they present the drawback of needing a very complex and
costly infrastructure.
At user level the GNSS integrity can be monitored by exploiting the redundancy of the GNSS
signals as collected at the receiver. This is done by performing calculations within the user
equipment itself to check the measurements consistency. This method is known as Receiver
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM). RAIM is possible as long as a number of observa-
tions larger than the minimum necessary for a position fix are available. RAIM strictly relies on
the strength of the satellite geometry. With the deployment of the new GNSS constellations
many more satellite signals will soon be available: this will increase the redundancy of mea-
surements and the RAIM power.
1.2. Integrity monitoring on land
Both SBAS/GBAS and RAIM methods can in principle be adopted for IM in land applications,
since the fundamental positioning problem is the same. However, some important differences
in the applications may make the task not straightforward. GNSS positioning in aviation is
generally restricted to Single Point Positioning (SPP), based on code observations on the civil
frequencies, L1 (E1 for Galileo) and soon L5 (E5). With SPP, accuracy of few meters is attain-
able. However, most current and future land applications (such as ITS) require lane-level
accuracy, i.e., sub-meter accuracy [7]. As such level of accuracy is considered unattainable with
SPS, ITS applications are foreseen to be relying on Satellite Based Augmentation Systems
(SBAS), RTK or Precise Point Positioning (PPP) techniques [7].
The different positioning methods and the corresponding higher precisions involved bring
with them a new set of specific vulnerabilities. For instance, anomalies that would create
positioning errors of too small magnitude in an SPP context, and could therefore been
Multifunctional Operation and Application of GPS24
neglected, would now need to be taken into account. In case carrier phase observations are
to be used, cycle-slip monitoring shall be included, as well as IM for ambiguity resolution.
Another difference from the aviation case that shall be taken into account is the environ-
ment in which positioning is to take place. Land users are often located in urban environ-
ment, which is characterized by the presence of high-rise buildings: as a result, GNSS
observations are highly more likely to be affected by multipath and Non-Line-of-Sight
(NLOS). Furthermore, the urban environment brings extra vulnerabilities linked to the
higher risk of interference.
As the SBAS integrity monitoring concept has not been defined yet for ITS applications, this
chapter focus is on the RAIM concept. This is in fact the most versatile integrity monitoring
approach, generally applicable to any estimation problem. The chapter is organized as follows:
in Section 2 the integrity as a navigation performance parameter is introduced and the focus
moves to the RAIM approach. The RAIM problem is defined and the most important perfor-
mance parameters of RAIM algorithms (PL, Probability of HMI, etc.) are introduced. In Section
3, a number of possible approaches to deal with the RAIM problem are introduced, whereas in
Section 4 the most popular RAIM methods developed in aviation are described. In Section 5
the challenges related to the adaptation of current aviation RAIMmethods to land applications
are illustrated, and in Section 6 an example of preliminary results of an IM prototype method
in ITS is shown. Finally, in Section 7 conclusions on the state-of-art in IM and directions of
present and future work are given.
2. Integrity and RAIM
2.1. Navigation performance parameters
The navigation system’s role is to collect and process measurements or other input data and
deliver a position/state estimation, and guide the user to reach their destination. Based on the
input data, called observables1, the parameters of interest are estimated. In the GNSS case, the
model for the estimation problem is non-linear, but it is standard practice to transform it into a
linear form, such as:
y ¼ Axþ e (1)
where y is a vector of m observables, x is the state vector (n components) of the parameters on
which the observables depend, among which are the parameters of interest, them nmatrix A
is the design matrix and e is a vector of measurement errors. y and e are random variables
(indicated by an underscore).
In the GNSS case, the observable y is constituted by the range measurements (code and carrier
phase) from each visible satellite, and in some cases by the Doppler observations, to determine
1
the term observable is used to refer to the random variable, while the term observation refers to its realization.
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the velocity of the user. Such observable can be further augmented with external measurements/
information, such as estimates of the ionosphere, troposphere, corrections for biases, or by other
navigation systems, such as INS. The design matrix A in (1) is determined by the geometrical
configuration of the satellites in view, which links the rangemeasurements to the unknowns, and
by all the linear relations that link the eventually available additional information (e.g. INS or
external corrections) to the unknowns.
In ITS, integrity is listed among the navigation key performance parameters (KPP), which have
been identified [1, 2] as: nolistsep [noitemsep].
• Accuracy. Accuracy defines how well the estimated or measured position agrees with the
true position. It is usually measured by the 95% confidence level for the position error, or
by the Root Mean Square Error. Accuracy is computed assuming that the system is
working in fault-free conditions, with standard performance.
• Integrity. Integrity defines the level of trust that can be given to the system. It is the ability
of the positioning system to identify when a pre-defined Alert Limit (a bound to the
position error) has been exceeded and to then provide timely warnings to drivers. Integ-
rity is measured by either: a) the Probability of Hazardous Misleading Information, PHMI,
which is the probability that a position error larger than an Alert Limit (AL) occurs
without a warning being timely raised, or b) the Protection Levels, which are the largest
position error that may occur without any warning being timely raised, with probability
smaller than the maximum allowed PHMI.
• Continuity. Continuity is the capability of the navigation system to provide a navigation
output with the specified level of accuracy and integrity throughout the intended period
of operation (POP). Continuity is expressed as the probability that during the POP the
system is providing trustworthy navigation information, without any disruption or Alert
being raised.
• Availability. Availability is the fraction of time the navigation function is usable, as deter-
mined by its compliance with accuracy, integrity and continuity requirements. At any
epoch of time, the navigation system is deemed either available or unavailable, depending
on whether the availability, integrity and continuity requirements are satisfied.
The KPPs are inter-related. In particular, integrity is tightly connected with continuity, since
raising an Alert constitutes a disruption to the continuity of the operations.
2.2. RAIM problem definition
Assume a single epoch scenario in which a user at an unknown position receives signals from
the GNSS satellites, and eventual positioning information from other augmentation systems/
external linkage. In this scenario, the RAIM problem is defined as: for any satellite geometry, to
which corresponds a certain statistical distribution of the observable y, find an ‘acceptance’
region Ω∈Rm (sub-domain of Rm ) and an estimation/detection function F y
 
that to the
observable y∈Ω assigns a position estimator bx:
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y∈Ω! bx ¼ F y  (2)
such that:
P bx  x∉ΩAL ∩ y∈Ω
 
¼ PHMI ≤PHMI ∀x (3)
and
P y∉Ω
 
¼ PFA ≤PFA ∀x (4)
where:
• PFA is the requirement of False Alert probability, themaximum allowable probability that an
Alert is raised by the algorithm and the continuity of the operation is interrupted, without
any actual reason. PFA is a sub-allocation of the full continuity requirement c, which has to
account also for justified Alert (e.g. in the occurrence of an actual hazardous anomaly).
• ΩAL is the ‘integrity region’ around the true position which boundaries are the Alert Limits
(AL). Fundamentally the position error is required to lie within the boundaries defined by the
ALs (therefore inside ΩAL) with an extremely high probability, 1 PHMI. While in aviation
this region is cylindrical, with the radius of the cylinder defined by the Horizontal Alert Limit
(HAL) and height defined by the Vertical Alert Limit (VAL), in ITS the shape of this region
has not been defined yet, and possibly will be dependent on the specific application. It is
expected that in most land applications the vertical error will not need to be monitored, and
only limits in the horizontal plane will be considered. On the horizontal plane, distinction
shall be made between along-track (AT) and cross-track (CT) directions of motion. A rectan-
gular integrity region could be used, defined by the ALs in the two directions, ALAT and
ALCT respectively. Alternatively, an ellipsoidal region could be adopted with semi-axes ALAT
and ALCT. Figure 1 shows the different types of integrity regions.
• PHMI, the (maximum allowed) Probability of Hazardous Misleading Information PHMI,
is the integrity requirement per epoch. This is the probability that the information on
the vehicle position is wrong by an amount larger than the ALs, without any alert or
warning on possibly present anomaly being provided along. In aviation PHMI values
range from 107 to 109 per operation (e.g. approach), whereas for ITS there are yet no
candidate values apart from those for aviation.
Figure 1. Integrity regions in aviation and in ITS.
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The acceptance regionΩ fundamentally defines the set of all the measurements y fromwhich it
is possible to determine a safe position estimate bx, i.e., for which the requirement on the PHMI is
satisfied.
In any geometry, the rule can be optimized in different ways. The two extreme approaches
would be: 1) minimizing the PHMI given the requirement on the continuity is satisfied, or
viceversa 2) minimizing the PFA (maximizing the continuity c) given the requirement on the
PHMI is satisfied. The first is usually the preferred approach.
2.3. Protection levels (PL)
To define the PLs the total requirement on the PHMI, the PHMI, must be split into the different
position components. In aviation, it is to be split into horizontal and vertical allocations, P
hor
HMI
and P
ver
HMI. In ITS instead, it is to be split between the horizontal along-track (AT) and cross-
track (CT) components, P
AT
HMI and P
CT
HMI, whereas the vertical component is (generally) not of
concern. PLAT and PLCT are defined as the maximum position error size (in the AT direction
and in the CT direction) that can pass undetected with a probability smaller or equal to the
probability requirements, P
AT
HMI and P
CT
HMI, i.e.,
PLAT ¼ argmin
δ
P jbxAT  xATj > δjNo Alert
 
≤P
AT
HMI
PLCT ¼ argmin
δ
P jbxCT  xCTj > δjNo Alert
 
≤P
CT
HMI
(5)
with P
AT
HMI þ P
CT
HMI ¼ PHMI. To satisfy the navigation availability requirement it has to be:
PLAT ≤ALAT and PLCT ≤ALCT (6)
If those equations are satisfied integrity is maintained for the epoch under consideration.
Instead of computing the PLs, the integrity monitoring system can simply compute the actual
PHMI or an upperbound for it, and then compare it to the requirement PHMI. If PHMI ≤PHMI,
integrity is maintained.
2.4. RAIM input, output and performance parameters
In this Section the input and output parameters of a RAIM algorithm are summarized. Figure 2
shows a schematic representation of a RAIM algorithm. A RAIM algorithm is constituted of
two blocks: the first one assesses the geometry or model strength the second one processes the
real time observations and assesses their coherency.
The model strength assessment takes as input the design matrix A and the distribution func-
tion of the observable f y, i.e., the observation model, at each epoch. Output of this first
assessment are the PLs and/or the PHMI, and consequently the availability prediction for that
epoch: if any PL > AL, or equivalently PHMI > PHMI, the navigation service is declared
Multifunctional Operation and Application of GPS28
unavailable. Such availability assessment can be made at each epoch on the basis of the model
strength, before the actual measurements are taken.
The observation coherency assessment takes as input the observations y at each epoch. The
output of the observations processing is the issue of a state of either Alert or No Alert for that
epoch; in case of No Alert, a position solution is provided to the user. In this step, a real time
check of the observations is performed. Alert is declared in case the sample measurement
taken is too inconsistent: the case y∉Ω introduced in the definition of RAIM problem.
Both blocks of the RAIM structure require as input the navigation requirements on integrity
and continuity, i.e., ΩAL, the integrity region, PHMI, the maximum allowed PHMI, and PFA, the
False Alert (or continuity) requirement. The performance of a RAIM algorithm can be mea-
sured over time by computing (estimating) the actual PFA, PHMI and PLs.
3. RAIM approaches
Since RAIM is linkedwith the estimationmethod, two approaches to RAIM can be distinguished:
• Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE) procedure: one adopts a standard estimation rule, for
instance the Best Linear Unbiased Estimation (BLUE [8], characterized by highest accu-
racy in fault-free conditions); in case the BLUE is not satisfying the integrity requirements
(i.e., too large PHMI, because a fault is suspected), one can switch to a different estimator,
e.g., a BLUE applied on a subset of the original measurements set. In this way the
suspected fault is excluded, and the associated bias in the estimation removed.
• Robust estimation: one adopts an estimation rule tailored to integrity. Instead of employing
the BLUE, one can sacrifice on some accuracy in fault-free conditions to gain in integrity.
A combination of both methods listed above is also possible. Here only FDE procedures
are analyzed.
Figure 2. RAIM scheme. Integrity can be assessed first on the basis of the model strength only, and next in real time after
an observation is taken.
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3.1. FDE procedure
In an FDE procedure one assumes the possible occurrence of different hypotheses, the fault-
free case (null hypothesis H0) and the occurrence of fault/anomalies (alternative hypotheses
Hi). An FDE procedure is applied to detect whether an anomaly is affecting the system, and, in
case of detection, exclude the anomalous observations. In a common FDE procedure, typically
the BLUE is applied to the model corresponding to the hypothesis Hi that is more likely (or
safer to use). Once it has been decided which hypothesis is most likely to hold true (this
decision is made through a statistical testing procedure), the estimator to be used is the BLUE
for the model corresponding to that hypothesis. The BLUE for the unknown x in the linear
model (1), assuming known dispersion of e, i.e., D eð Þ ¼ Qy, reads:
bx ¼ Sy (7)
with S ¼ ATQ1y A
 1
ATQ1y the pseudo-inverse of matrix A in the metric defined by Qy.
Fundamentally bx y  in this approach will be constituted by different linear functions of the
observable: it will be in the form of (7) when the null hypothesis H0 is considered most likely,
or conversely different forms bxi when they one of the alternative hypothesis is designated to be
most likely.
3.2. Statistical hypothesis testing
FDE procedures are based on statistical hypothesis testing [9]. In an FDE procedure statistical
tests are performed to determine which hypothesis (fault-free/faulty) on the system state is
most likely to hold, and determine the observable domain subdivision discussed in Section 3.1.
In this chapter only linear models are analyzed, therefore a special attention shall be given to
statistical hypothesis testing in linear models. The aim is to decide between competing linear
models that could describe the observed phenomenon or process, once an observation has
been made. Furthermore the observables are assumed to have normal distributions, and differ-
ent hypotheses differ only in the specification of the functional model. The models considered
are thus Gauss-Markov models [10].
Given the linear model of Eq. (1), we assume the random noise distribution to be known,
Gaussian and zero mean:
e  N 0;Qy
 
(8)
The linear system in (1) represents the state of standard or nominal operations, that is the case
in which the system is working properly without any fault. This state is considered as the null
hypothesis H0. The case of a fault affecting the system constitutes instead a different state,
described by an alternative hypothesis Ha, under which the linear model assumes a different
form. Therefore:
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H0 : y ¼ Axþ e
Ha : y ¼ Axþ Cy∇þ e
(9)
where Cy is a m q matrix which represents the ‘signature’ of the errors in the measurements
and ∇ is a q-sized vector that contains the sizes of the biases in each degree of freedom (q) of Cy.
To test Ha against H0, the Uniformly Most Powerful Invariant (UMPI) test statistic (through
application of the Generalized Likelihood Ratio (GLR) criterion) reads:
Tq ¼ beT0Q1y Cy CTyQ1y Qe^0be0Q1y Cy
 1
CTyQ
1
y be0 (10)
where be0 ¼ y Abx0 is the vector of residuals computed considering the null hypothesis hold-
ing true (bx0 being the position estimator under the null hypothesis, obtained by Eq. (7)).
The test statistic Tq is χ
2 distributed:
H0 : Tq  χ
2 q; 0ð Þ and Ha : Tq  χ
2 q;λð Þ (11)
with non-centrality parameter:
λ ¼ ∇TQ1
∇^
∇ (12)
where Q1
∇^
¼ CTyQ
1
y Qe^0Q
1
y Cy, Qe^0 ¼ P
⊥
AQyP
⊥T
A and P
⊥
A ¼ I  A A
TQ1y A
 1
ATQ1y .
Knowing (though only partially in case of Ha ) the distributions of the test statistic under the
different hypotheses, one can define a critical region K (to reject the null hypothesis) on the
basis of type I and type II error probabilities. The critical region is one sided, of the type:
K : Tq > k (13)
with k the test threshold (or critical value).
The theory above constitutes the basis of statistical hypothesis testing in linear models, that
allows to build the specific test in the simple binary case of null versus one alternative
hypothesis. In case one has to choose among multiple alternative hypotheses, one option is to
employ a set of binary tests. However, a number of different methods exist in statistics, aiming
to answer this more complex problem. Hypothesis testing based methods are known as
Multiple Comparisons methods [11], while other methods that do not recur to hypothesis
testing are known as Subset Selection methods [12].
4. The aviation legacy
In this section, first the observation models and the typical assumptions adopted in civil aviation
applications are described, and next the two most popular RAIM algorithms developed for such
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applications, i.e., the Weighted RAIM [13] and the Advanced RAIM (ARAIM) [14] algorithms,
are introduced.
4.1. GNSS anomalies and their models
The main categories of High Dynamics Threats (HDTs) to be monitored in aviation applica-
tions, which rely on code-based SPP, are here listed. The HDTs are threats that cannot be
monitored by the GNSS ground control system, as opposed to the Low Dynamics Threats
(LDTs) [14]. They are categorized into: [noitemsep].
• Clock and ephemeris estimation errors, see [15];
• Signal deformations, see [16];
• Code-carrier incoherency, see [17];
From the snap-shot perspective (considering a single epoch of time), and working with carrier-
phase smoothed code measurements, an outlier in a single satellite is believed to be the main
threat (in terms of probability of occurrence). Simultaneous outliers on multiple satellites (wide
failure errors) can occur, but with a much lower likelihood [14]. Among these are the constel-
lation faults (e.g. upload of incorrect navigation messages that may impact a full constellation).
Errors/anomalies in signal propagation, as ionosphere, troposphere and multipath, shall not be
considered hazardous for aviation when the new civil frequency L5/E5, and new certified
receivers, are available: the tropospheric delay has typically a small effect (and one can correct
sufficiently well for this error source), ionosphere gradients/fronts effects are supposed to
cancel out with the use of ionosphere-free combination, and multipath depends on the local
satellite-receiver geometry and can be considered on a per satellite basis (typically outlier-like).
4.2. General distribution of the observable
In the previous section the main threats possibly affecting the positioning system in aviation
applications have been described: on this basis a model to describe the distribution of the
observable, able to take into account the possible occurrence of anomalies, shall be formulated.
The pdf of y is generally supposed to be known in standard fault free conditions, but it cannot
be fully defined in the presence of anomalies. However, it is assumed that anomalies in the
systems will occur with a low failure rate.
Different hypotheses can be defined to represent the state of the system: a fault free (null)
hypothesis H0 and Na alternative hypothesis Hi, representing the different possible types of
anomalies affecting the system, with i ¼ 1,…, Na. Here only linear models are considered, and
hypotheses of the type of Eq. (9), i.e., Hi : y ¼ Axþ ∇yi þ e.
Single satellite faults and constellation faults can be modeled by different Ci matrices: in case of
single satellite faults, or combinations of independent single satellite faults, the main Ci ‘s to
consider shall be the canonical unit vectors of Rm or m q matrices made up of different
canonical unit vectors of Rm, respectively; in case of constellation faults, a matrix Ci of m n
columns, fully complementing A in the vector space Rm, shall be used.
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The distribution of the observable y depends on the state of the system. Under each hypothesis,
y is assumed to be distributed as a multivariate normal distribution (Eqs. (1), (8) and (9)). It is
possible to associate prior probabilities to the occurrence of the different hypotheses, in such a
way that the variable H, representing the state of the system, has a prior Probability Mass
Function (PMF), with discrete values pi for each realization. Thus H and y marginal distribu-
tions are:
H 
P H ¼ H0ð Þ ¼ p0
P H ¼ H1ð Þ ¼ p1
⋮
P H ¼ HNa
 
¼ pNa
) y  p0  f y∣H0 þ
XNa
i¼1
pi  f y∣Hi
8>><
>>:
(14)
At this point the uncertainty about the y distribution is expressed by its dependence on the
unknown variable ∇i beside x. To tackle this uncertainty, most RAIM algorithms assume
worst-case bias scenarios or compute bounds for the worst-case risk that could result, see for
instance [18].
4.3. Weighted RAIM
In [13] a Weighted RAIM implementation is described. This constitutes one of the first relevant
RAIM algorithms conceived and is still in use today, typically implemented in aviation grade
GPS receivers, to provide low-precision lateral integrity only. The method consists of the two
steps defined in Section 2.4, the model strength assessment and the real time observation
coherency assessment. Even though not theorized in the original paper, the method is based
on the assumption of the observable distribution described in previous section, with the
constraint that only single satellite faults are possibly occurring.
A single test, the OMT, is used to judge the quality of the observations at each epoch [13]. The
OMT, also known as χ2 test, is a UMPI test that employs a test statistic of the form of Eq. (10),
and addressing a most generic anomaly, i.e., with q ¼ m n. Such test statistic coincides with
the Weighted Sum of Squared Errors (WSSE), defined as:
WSSE ¼ beTQ1y be (15)
If this statistic exceeds a certain threshold k, the estimated position is assumed significantly
biased; otherwise, it is assumed acceptable. This threshold is chosen to meet the probability of
False Alert requirement, PFA, knowing that in the fault-free hypothesis, the WSSE is distrib-
uted as a central χ2 with m 4 degrees of freedom (using GPS only).
4.4. Model strength assessment
If a range error from one measurement occurs, the expected value of the test statistic grows,
along with, proportionally, the expected position error. The satellite geometry determines how
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the error in the range domain propagates into the position domain. The original Weighted
RAIM algorithm focuses on monitoring only the vertical component of the position solution,
but the same reasoning can be made for the other components. In a simple two-dimensional
graph, plotting
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
WSSE
p
on the horizontal axis and the vertical position error on the vertical
axis, their relation can be represented by a straight line (see Figure 3), with a steepness (slope),
for satellite i given by:
Vslopei ¼
∣S 3;i½ ∣σiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1 PA i;i½ 
p (16)
with S ¼ ATQ1y A
 1
ATQ1y , σi ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
Qyi
q
¼ σyi and where the subscripts in square brackets
indicate the indexes of the matrix elements’. The Vertical Protection Level (VPL) is computed as:
VPL  max
i
Vslopei
 
kþ kMDσx^3 i ¼ 1, 2,…, m (17)
where k and kMD are obtained as:
k ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
inv-χ2CDF PFA;m n
 q
; kMD ¼ Ψ
1 PHMI
mp
 
(18)
with inv-χ2CDF ;m nð Þ the inverse of a central χ
2 CDF function with m n degrees of free-
dom, Ψ ð Þ the tail probability of the cumulative distribution function of a zero mean unit
Gaussian distribution, and p the a-priori probability of hazardous fault in one satellite. The
above formulas for the VPL are based on the following expression of the integrity risk under
an alternative hypothesis:
PHMI∣Hi ¼ PMDi  P jbx3  x3j > VALjHi  (19)
which assumes that an integrity event corresponds to the simultaneous occurrence of an MD
and a positioning error larger than the Vertical AL (VAL), and is justified by the fact that test
Figure 3. Representation of the weighted RAIM’s Vslope concept.
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statistic and positioning error are uncorrelated. The VPL is the measure of the observation
model strength: if VPL > VAL, integrity is not available for the geometry considered.
4.5. Real time availability
The real time availability assessment is performed if the model strength assessment was passed
successfully (VPL < VAL). At each epoch, once the observations are collected, the WSSE is com-
puted and comparedwith the threshold. As in standard hypothesis testing, we have the following
decision rule:
If WSSE > k, reject the fault-free hypothesis and declare Alert (20)
else standard operations continue.
4.6. ARAIM
The Weighted RAIM presented in the previous section was developed for the single GPS
constellation and has been found generally suboptimal, even though presenting a very practi-
cal and efficient approach. An enhanced approached, known as ARAIM, provides the follow-
ing improvements [14]:
• in addition to single satellite faults, multi-dimensional faults (affecting multiple satellites
at a time) are accounted for [14, 18];
• the potential of the multi-constellation GNSS is fully exploited, instead of GPS only [14, 18];
• rather than using only single-frequency observations, use of dual-frequency observations,
to remove the first order ionospheric delay, is foreseen, [14, 18];
• a proof of safety is given [14, 18]. Weighted RAIM is not proven to be always conservative;
• different statistical tests, more tailored to detecting faults that have sensible impact on the
position estimate [19], are employed.
The basic concepts of ARAIM are here outlined. For more details, see [14, 18, 19]. Figure 4
shows a block diagram representation of the ARAIM algorithm. From a statistical point of
view, ARAIM is based on the following concepts:
• Multiple Hypothesis approach with a-priori probabilities: the system is supposed to be in
one out of a set of different possible states described by multiple hypotheses, to each of
which is assigned an a-priori probability of occurrence (Section 4.2). The PHMI is computed
by the sum of the PHMI under the different hypotheses, weighted on the base of their prior
probabilities.
• Solution Separation (SS) as test statistics: to discriminate between hypotheses, to eventu-
ally exclude faulty measurements, the difference between the position solutions under the
different alternative hypotheses and the null hypothesis is computed and used as a test
statistic. For each alternative hypothesis considered a difference vector (SS) is computed
and a test is run for each of the position components of the vector.
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If one characterizes each alternative hypothesis by a different subscript i, the i th Solution
Separation vector can be written as:
TSSi ¼
b∇bxi ¼ bx0  bxi (21)
where bx0 and bxi are the position solutions obtained employing the null and the alternative
model respectively, i e.:
bx0 ¼ ATQ1y A
 1
ATQ1y y ¼ Sy
bxi ¼ ATQ1yi A
 1
ATQ1yi
y ¼ Siy
(22)
where Q1yi is obtained from Q
1
y replacing the diagonal elements corresponding to the faulty
satellites in hypothesis Hi with 0 (this means giving zero weight to such observations). In
practice, these tests have similar performance to the UMPI tests (see [20, 21]).
4.7. Model strength assessment
The PLs are computed on the basis of the model strength (satellite geometry and stochastic
model), and compared to the AL to determine the integrity availability. The computation of the
PLs is based on an iterative procedure: the PLs are determined in such a way that the sum of
the PHMIi under each alternative hypothesis is equal to the full PHMI requirement:
PHMI ¼
XNa
i
PHMIi ¼
XNa
i
PMDi  P bx  x∉ΩALjHið Þ	 
 (23)
Figure 4. ARAIM baseline architecture. The algorithm checks the coherency of the observations by means of the solution
separation tests, evaluates the possibility of excluding corrupted observations with exclusion specific tests, and computes
the PLs. Integrity is guaranteed if PLs < ALs.
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where in the last equality the relation (19) is applied. As a result, the VPL must satisfy the
following equation [18]:
2Ψ
VPL
σbx0,3
 !
þ
XNa
i¼1
piΨ
VPL ki,3
σbx i ,1
 !
¼ ζPHMI (24)
where ki,3 is the test threshold for the i th SS test, 3 rd component (vertical), and ζ is the fraction
of the full PHMI allocated to the vertical direction (0 < ζ < 1). The HPL instead is computed
with HPL ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
PL2x1 þ PL
2
x2
q
, where PL2x1 and PL
2
x2
, the PLs for the two horizontal components,
are computed with formulas equivalent to (24). The thresholds ki, j are computed with
ki, j ¼ Ψ
1 PFA
4Na
 
σ
∇^ x^ i, j
(25)
where σ
∇^x^ i, j
is the standard deviation of the corresponding SS test statistic (see [18]). If any
PL > AL, integrity is not available for the geometry considered.
4.8. Real time availability
In ARAIM the testing is subdivided in two steps:
1. Detection tests: the SS tests are computed and compared to their thresholds; if none of the
tests exceeds the threshold, the fault-free hypothesis is confirmed and standard operations
continue, otherwise the algorithm proceeds to the next step.
2. Exclusion confirmation tests: extra tests are run to determine if it is safe to exclude some
observations and continue to provide navigation service. These tests are meant to mini-
mize the risk of wrong identification. More details are given in [18].
After detection and eventual exclusion of observations, the PLs are re-computed (as post-
observations PLs) and compared with the thresholds. If any PLpost > AL, an Alert is raised.
5. The ITS challenge
Asmentioned in Section 1.2, whenmoving from aviation to land applications, a number of issues
have to be taken into account in the context of integrity monitoring. The main two issues are:
• Positioning has to be performed in urban environment: additional vulnerabilities are to be
taken into account, i.e., multipath, NLOS, interference and spoofing.
• Higher precision/smaller PLs are required: this may lead to the use of precise positioning
techniques (PPP, RTK) with their additional vulnerabilities, as well as additional naviga-
tion sensors/technologies (INS,V2I and V2I communication, camera, etc.).
The main assumptions on which the FDE procedures and RAIM algorithms described so far
rely on are (Section 4.2): 1) linear estimation problem, 2) Gaussianity of the observables and 3)
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mean-shift model for the anomalies. In land applications, these assumptions are likely to hold,
though multipath and NLOS may challenge the second one, while the large number of obser-
vations available and vulnerabilities increases the computational complexity of FDE proce-
dures. These aspects are addressed in more detail in the following.
5.1. Urban environment: multipath, NLOS and interference
Multipath is the most significant source of measurement errors in ITS applications, as it is
dependent on the environment surrounding the antenna and is especially intense in dense
urban areas. Buildings and other obstacles degrade the signal reception in three ways: 1)
signals are completely blocked and unavailable for positioning, 2) signals are blocked in their
direct path, but are still received via a reflected path, with the NLOS reception, 3) both direct
Line-Of-Sight (LOS) and reflected signals are received, i.e., the case of multipath. NLOS code
signals can exhibit positive ranging errors of tens of meters magnitude in dense urban areas.
Numerous innovative techniques have been developed in the recent years to address the
multipath and NLOS threats in urban environment. Interest was raised by 3D-map-aided
(3DMA) GNSS, a range of different techniques that use 3D mapping data to improve GNSS
positioning accuracy in dense urban areas. 3D models of the buildings can be used to predict
which signals are blocked and which are directly visible at any location [22, 23]. A technique
that determines position by comparing the measured signal availability and strength with
predictions made using a 3D city model over a range of candidate positions is known as the
shadow matching technique [24]. Such techniques may possibly be integrated with RAIM
algorithms for ITS in the near future.
5.2. Precise positioning techniques and multi-sensor integration
The use of precise positioning techniques rather than SPP and the need of integration with
other sensors bring a number of complications to the IM for land applications. Some of the
main challenges are summarized in the following.
5.2.1. PPP and RTK: Carrier phase observations vulnerabilities
Precise positioning techniques employ carrier phase observations next to code observations.
Even though the estimation problem is characterized by a much larger number of observations
and unknowns to solve for, it is still a linear estimation problem. The same hypothesis testing
theory applies, and therefore, the same RAIM concepts developed for aviation can be implem-
ented, with appropriate adjustments. However, one drawback of the ARAIM is the associated
heavy computational burden, due to the need of running a test for each possible combination of
simultaneously biased observations. When multi-systems, multi-frequency and carrier phase
based positioning is in use, the total number of combinations of possibly biased observations
increases dramatically — so does the computational load for the algorithm. It is thus possible
that the current ARAIM approach will not be optimal.
Another issue is constituted by the additional vulnerabilities that affect the precise positioning
techniques, mainly carrier phase multipath and cycle-slips. Multipath affects carrier-phase
observations with the same mechanism as code observations [25]. Carrier-phase multipath is
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one of the critical elements in determining the Time to Ambiguity Resolution (TAR), which can
become of concern in regards of timeliness requirements. Furthermore, cycle-slips, which consti-
tute the main RTK-specific threat, as they can cause wrong ambiguity fixing and result in large
errors in the positioning, require specific additional monitoring. There is a vast literature on
cycle-slip detection, e.g., by [26, 27]. Most cycle-slip detection methods are based on hypothesis
testing, but exploit the multi-epoch data processing to increase their detection power.
5.2.2. Multi-sensor integration and recursive data processing
Use of multiple sensors for navigation means that extra observations shall be integrated with
the GNSS observations. If the extra observations are linear in the unknown parameters, they
can be simply stacked together in the same linear estimation problem. Integration with INS is a
complex problem on which a large literature exist [28]. Finally, while the focus of this chapter
was only on snapshot RAIM (single epoch), RAIM techniques for multi-epoch recursive data
processing are under development [29].
5.2.3. Cooperative integrity monitoring (CIM) concept
Section 2.4 shows that an integrity assessment can be made before the observations are taken,
when only satellite geometry and environment are known or partially known. New IM con-
cepts intend to exploit the fact that satellite geometry and satellite visibility can be reasonably
predicted at any time and location (for instance with the use of city models), and that the same
observability conditions repeat periodically over time. Beside the environment nearby the
receiver in its nominal conditions, these new concepts plan to exploit also the potentialities
offered by a Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET) infrastructure [30]. The potential availability
of multiple observations of GNSS signals, taken by different vehicles participating to a VANET,
can be shared and combined in order to implement a collaborative spatial/temporal character-
ization and prediction of the local degradation of the GNSS signals.
6. An example
In this section, the results of a first attempt to perform IM in urban environment employing the
RTK positioning method with a short baseline, and applying a prototype ARAIM algorithm,
are shown. Such results are only indicative, since most of the assumptions behind the use of
ARAIM in an RTK set-up are yet to be justified.
A kinematic test is conducted for practical demonstration of IM for ITS. A small vehicle is fitted
with a Trimble multi-GNSS geodetic receiver and a survey-grade antenna. The test is carried out
in a dense urban area in Tokyo, Japan. The RTK system uses GPS, GLONASS and BeiDou dual-
frequency observations with a sampling rate of 10 Hz. A prototype RAIM algorithm derived
fromARAIM is implemented. Due to the lack of common standards, the PLs are computed in the
test using different values of PHMI ranging from 10
3 to 106 in order to track empirically the
impact of PHMI on the obtained results. A false alert probability (PFA) of 0.01 is applied.
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Figure 5 shows the PL for the along-track and cross-track directions (shown as PLAT and PLCT)
and the absolute values of the positioning errors along these directions (denoted as errAT and
errCT) using an integrity risk of 10
4 and 106 as examples. The figure shows that the RTK with
correct ambiguity fixing gives positioning errors within a few centimeters. The average abso-
lute value of the AT and CT positioning errors are 0.058 and 0.054 m, respectively. The FDE
method detected 15 code observations with severe irregularities, which are attributed to high
multipath in this environment. These observations were excluded from further processing.
There were a few cases where the ambiguity fixing seemed to be incorrect by one or two
cycles, which were not detected by the FDE procedure. However, the PL adapted to these
situations and bounded this error as illustrated in the Figure 5. Inspection of the Figure also
shows that when using RTK with correct ambiguity fixing, an Alert Limit (AL) can be safely
chosen as 1 m. The sub-decimeter positioning accuracy of RTK is bounded by a tight protection
level. The positioning errors in the test were always bounded by the PLs, and PLs < ALs for
the whole period, with an integrity availability of 100%. The medians of the PL for the AT and
CT using different integrity risk (PHMI) values are given in the Table 1. Both table and Figure 5
show that the PLs increase with the decrease of the allowed integrity risk.
Figure 5. PLAT and PLCT and positioning errors in the AT and CT directions for the integrated positioning systems using
PHMI ¼ 10
4 (top panel) and PHMI ¼ 10
6 (bottom panel).
Integrity risk (PHMI) 10
3 104 105 106
PLAT 0.176 0.197 0.215 0.232
PLCT 0.148 0.164 0.177 0.188
Table 1. Median PLAT & PLCT in meters for different values of integrity risk (PHMI).
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7. Concluding remarks
In this chapter the concepts of integrity and IM have been introduced, and the main RAIM
methods currently in use or under development have been presented. As these methods were
developed in the aviation context, their adoption in land applications has been discussed. The
positioning methods used in land applications still satisfy the assumptions made by current
RAIM algorithms, though great care shall be taken in addressing the larger number of vulner-
abilities affecting the positioning system, in particular multipath and the carrier-phase specific
vulnerabilities. Some preliminary but promising results of the application of a RAIM algorithm
in urban environment were shown. Further research and practical experiments are necessary
to strengthen the confidence in the models.
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